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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v.

:

SCOTT A L A N DELANEY,

:

Case N

' ^081 ^ C B

Priority No, 2

Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute

second degree

felony,

.™

1 9 9 3 ) , i n the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Juab
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ray M
This Cou-*
Ann. §

Harding, presiding.

appeal under Utah Code
^uyi

b *,c* <

1993).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented on appeal:
I
offj

Did the t i i a 1 court permissibl

nil reasonable B U H J J M loni in

"

t

rule that t lip"

defendant's vehicle for

speeding and further detain defendant t:. investigate his
suspicion that defendant was transporting illegal n a r f n H ' ^ wh^n
the M1 1 i c "e i" s\m

tl :it s ::: ::i :: >:i : ::: f i ai i j uana emanating from

defendant's vehicle?
court's d e t e r m i n a t e
unless clearly erroneous.

State v.

Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987); State v. Leonard, 825
P.2d 664, 667-68 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042
(Utah 1992).

But see State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13 (Utah App.

1991) (applying nondeferential, "correction of error" standard in
reviewing trial court's reasonable suspicion determination),
cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).
2.

Did the trial court properly determine that

defendant voluntarily consented to a search of his vehicle?
"[Tjhe trial court's ultimate conclusion that a consent
was voluntary or involuntary is to be reviewed for correctness [;]
[however,] [t]he trial court's underlying factual findings will
not be set aside unless they are found to be clearly erroneous."
State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 26 (Utah Jan. 7, 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U. S. Const. Amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
The text of any other pertinent provisions, statutes or
rules is incorporated in the argument section of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant and co-defendant Michael Dale Lovegren were
charged by information with possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv) (Supp. 1993) (R. 1).
2

Defendant and Lovegren filed a motion to suppress the evidence
seized b y the arresting officii

ill- li. i

M M i .in v 'Mdeui iai y

hearing and submission ol; niemorandum by both parties, the trial
court denied the motion in .-. signed memorandum decision (R, 1 8 27,

28-43,

4*±y .

l i i e ('* •turf

niriilH \ n|in-ji.l IxnduiM'ij u l

,1 «,

conclusion of Taw ?p well entering a signed order denying
defendant's motion

46-50

(Copies

•*

- ^ ** 'r

memorandum decisior

. .

its order of denial are attached hereto Addendum A

;

signed
: a w . and

B, anrl C,

respectively.)
Defendant w a s • * >TI » J < Mil I I I« >> i i

i

bene L trial # and

the trial court sentenced him to a term of one to 15 years in the
Utah State Prison.

T h e Court, however, suspended imposition of

the flpntence anil placed ('lefendarii

» |.».robatJon

((<'. ' J IS)

(A

copy of the trial court's "Judgment, Sentence and Order of
Probation" is attached hereto as Addendum !)) .*
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The findings of fact entered by t ! r trial court after
an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion
reproelui

"

rni^u'ess in

»rei'baL,j m, beJuv* i
On M a y 14, 1991 Sergeant Paul V, Mangelson, a 24

year veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol, with extensive
and ex|j»ei: i ein'i-

I hi u

training

i nl < 11 i law enforcement and drug

1

T h e trial court found that there w a s insufficient evidence
to demonstrate that Lovegren was "participating with o r aware of
the drugs, h e w a s merely driving t h e car" (R. 5 6 ) . Accordingly,
Lovegren was found not guilty (R 57) and he is not a party to
this appeal.
3

identification, stopped a vehicle for speeding 71 m.p.h. in a 65
m.p.h. zone on 1-15 in the area of the South Nephi interchange.
The officer had measured the speed by means of a stationary
radar.
2.

The driver of the vehicle was the defendant,

Michael Dale Lovegren.

The vehicle was registered to the

defendant, Scott Alan Delaney, who was a passenger in the
vehicle•
3.

While talking with the driver, the officer smelled

a strong odor of marijuana which was quite obvious about the
vehicle.
4.

The officer then asked the occupants if they had

any guns, drugs or alcohol in the vehicle.

The passenger, Mr.

Delaney, stated that he had some beer in the trunk.

Both

occupants denied there was any drugs in the vehicle.

The officer

then asked the occupants if the minded if he looked through the
vehicle.

Mr. Delaney the said, "Do you want to look in the

trunk?".

The officer replied that he would like to look in both

the trunk and the interior. At that time both defendants seemed
apprehensive, b[ut] gave consent by saying "Go ahead".
5.

The officer then requested both occupants to exit

the vehicle and patted them down for weapons.

The officer then

searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle.

He first

found a cellophane bag containing marijuana on the passenger side
of the vehicle.

The officer then found a good size bindle

containing cocaine under the pleat of the driver's seat. The
4

officer then placed both defendants under arrest for possession
of controlled substances.
)fficer then
pursuant ;

*•

.-•.,

Highway Patrol written policy with respect

to inventorying all vehicles that are to be separated from the
occupants after arrest.

The officer tl len fnund HI laiqe aniouji! of

cocaine, additional marijuana and drug paraphernalia in a red
duffle bag.
(R. 101-03) (Findings
"Findings" a*-

lereafter

Attached hereto as Addendum

Based on its findings of fact, the trial court entered
the following roue] us ionn
1

Il III

The stop of the subject vehicle was a

constitutionally valid stop based upon reasonable suspicion of
speedi
2

The search of the subject vehicle which resulted in

the initial discovery of M>> controlled substance was made
pursua

defendants, which was given

voluntarily without duress
search

as therefore a valid warrantless

See State v. Schlosser, 774 p.2d 1132 (Utah,

(R. 4b
The trial court then denied defendant's motion
suppress

following a bench trial, defendant was

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's finding that the vehicle owned by
defendant, and in which defendant was a passenger, was speeding
is not clearly erroneous because it is supported by the trooper's
testimony.

Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that

the stop was valid.

Because defendant presented no evidence to

indicate that a reasonable officer would not normally stop a
vehicle under similar circumstances, his claim that the stop was
pretextual was properly rejected by the trial court.
Similarly, the trial court's finding that defendant
consented to a warrantless search of his vehicle is not clearly
erroneous because it is supported by the trooper's testimony that
defendant gave his consent.

Because there is no evidence that

indicates defendant's consent was the product of coercion or
duress, the trial court correctly concluded that defendant's
consent was given voluntarily.

This Court should therefore

uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress
and affirm his conviction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE
TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
ARRESTING OFFICER STOPPED DEFENDANT BASED ON
HIS HAVING OBSERVED THE VEHICLE IN WHICH
DEFENDANT WAS A PASSENGER TRAVELING IN EXCESS
OF THE POSTED SPEED LIMIT.
The trial court properly determined that the trooper
validly stopped defendant's vehicle because the trooper had
reasonable suspicion to believe defendant's vehicle, which was
6

driven by Lovegren, was speeding.

Defendant's claim that the

stop was invalid because the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion
is t h e r e f o r e i"i:ii L H ' ' 1 * , ,L I

'

' "" t "i ,' I he s t o p f o r

speeding was a pretext to allow the trooper an opportunity :
search defendant's vehicle.
A

Ml: i

review

A trial court's determination that reasonable suspicion
existed is a finding

f

+-- " s u b j e c t t o t :

i

deferenti;

Jtate v. Mendoza, :±o i'.2d 181,

183 (Utah 1987); State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 667-68 (Utah
App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P 2d 1 0 4 2 (Utah -• —

. state v.

Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah ADD. 1990): State v. Talbot,
792 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935,
941-42 (Utah App. 1988) .
A d v . R e p , J ii, I,1 I
joined by Jackson,

See also Stat..

itah A p p 3 993)

(Bench,

T

concurring,

(arguing that Mendoza's standard of review

has not been altered by 8 tate v
19:93))

Aocneli

rnurman.

But see State v. Munsen, P?n P ?.

>.:a;. app.. .^v±)

(applying nondeferential, "correction of error" standard in
r e v e r s i n g t r i a l c u m I " i i ease W\H\\ I < HIIS| I I i' i \ HI l«t e t m i Udi. J UII i ,
cert, denied, 84,3 I ".2d 516 (Utah 1992).

Factual findings are not

clearly erroneous unless they are against the clear weight of the
rFHrlip*1 a "d^i i n 11 e a n d liim

e v i d e n c e , o r t h e a p p e l l a t e count

conviction" that the trial court was mistaken.
790 P.2d 65, 62 (Utah App. lyyoj.

7

State v. Webb.

B.

Reasonable Suspicion Standard

There is reasonable suspicion to justify an
investigative stop if, from the facts apparent to an officer and
the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the officer would
reasonably suspect that criminal activity is afoot.

Terrv v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d at 667.
See also State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah App. 1992).
"This suspicion must be 'based upon articulated "objective facts"
then apparent to the officer.'"

Roth. 827 P.2d at 257 (quoting

Sandv Citv v. Thorsness. 778 P.2d 1011, 1012 (Utah App. 1989)).
Reasonable suspicion "is considerably less than proof of
wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence."
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).

United States v.

The level of suspicion required

for an investigative stop "is obviously less demanding than that
for probable cause."

Ibid.

In evaluating the validity of such a

stop, a court must consider "'the totality of the circumstances
-- the whole picture.'"

Id. at 8 (quoting United States v.

Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
257.

See also Roth. 827 P.2d at

As Sokolow notes:
"The process does not deal with hard
certainties, but with probabilities. Long
before the law of probabilities was
articulated as such, practical people
formulated certain common-sense conclusions
about human behavior; jurors as factfinders
are permitted to do the same -- and so are
law enforcement officers."

Ibid, (quoting Cortez. 449 U.S. at 418).
Furthermore, that the behavior may be as consistent
with innocent conduct as criminal does not defeat a finding of
8

reasonable suspicion.

As the Supreme Court said in Sokolow:

11

' [T]here could, of course, be circumstances in which wholly

lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal activity
was afoot.'

Indeed, Terry itself involved 'a series of acts,

each of them perhaps innocent' if viewed separately, 'but which
taken together warranted further investigation.'"

490 U.S. at 9-

10 (quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per
curiam); Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)).
C.

The Instant Case

Here, the trial court found that there was reasonable
suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle for speeding.
Specifically, the trial court found that defendant's vehicle was
traveling at a rate of 71 m.p.h. in a 65 m.p.h zone (R. 47).
Although defendant argues on appeal that this finding is clearly
erroneous because Lovegren testified that their vehicle was going
no faster than 60 m.p.h., five miles under the posted speed limit
(R. 154-55), that does not compel the conclusion that the trial
court's finding is clearly erroneous. Rather, because the
arresting trooper testified that he clocked the defendant's
vehicle at 71 m.p.h. by radar (R. 112-13), there is competent
evidence to support the trial court's finding of fact.

The trial

court's finding is therefore not clearly erroneous.
Moreover, the logical inference to be drawn from the
court's finding that the car was traveling 71 m.p.h. is that the
court found the trooper's testimony more credible than that of
the two defendants.

The determination of what testimony to
9

believe is essentially a question of witness credibility, which
is best resolved by the trial court given its advantaged position
to judge the demeanor of each witness.

See, e.g., State v.

Harcrraves, 806 P.2d 228, 231 (Utah App. 1991).
Here, defendant's and Lovegren's testimony that they
had a radar detector so that they could travel in excess of the
posted speed limit is difficult reconcile with their claim that
they were traveling five miles per hour under the posted speed
limit (R. 148-49, 155, 158). Moreover, Lovegren testified that
he passed two other vehicles just before he saw the trooper in
his rear view mirror (R. 154, 159). According to Lovegren, he
again looked at his speedometer and saw that it read 60 miles per
hour (R. 159). Given that the posted speed limit was 65 m.p.h.,
the trial court could have reasonably rejected all of Lovegren's
testimony because it is difficult to believe he could have passed
two other vehicles if he was only going 60 miles per hour.
Defendant's and Lovegren's testimony appears even less credible
when coupled with their insistence that the radar detector never
indicated the presence of a radar gun, which might well have
bolstered their claim that they were not speeding at the time
they drove by the trooper (R. 149, 159).
In short, although the testimony on the issue of how
fast the defendant's vehicle was traveling was conflicted,
defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court's
finding that defendant's vehicle was speeding is against the
clear weight of the evidence.

Given the trooper's testimony, it
10

cannot be said that the trial court clearly erred in finding that
the defendant's vehicle was travelling at 71 m.p.h. in a 65
m.p.h. zone.
Not only does defendant argue that the trooper lacked
reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle for speeding, he also
asserts the officer did not have any basis to stop the vehicle
for suspicion of narcotics trafficking and that the stop for
speeding was therefore pretextual. Accordingly, defendant claims
the stop of the car was unconstitutional.

As demonstrated below,

defendant's argument should be summarily rejected.
Even though the trooper eventually investigated the
possibility that defendant and Lovegren were transporting illegal
narcotics, such did not undermine the legality of the stop for
the speeding violation.

It is well settled that

lf

[w]hether a

Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective
assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting him at the time, and not on the
officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action
was taken."

Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985)

(citations omitted).
128, 138 (1978).

Accord Scott v. United States. 436 U.S.

The act of speeding, committed in the trooper's

presence, supplied reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's
vehicle.

State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 702 (Utah App. 1992);

United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 815, reh'a denied. 941
F.2d 1086 (10th Cir. 1991) (both holding stop for speeding was
valid).
11

This Court applies the following standard for
determining whether a pretext stop has occurred:

fl

[I]f a

hypothetical reasonable police officer would not have stopped the
driver for the cited offense, and the surrounding circumstances
indicate the stop is a pretext, the stop is unconstitutional."
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 979 (Utah App. 1988), disavowed on
other grounds. State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 1990)•
The inquiry focuses on whether the reasonable officer would have
made a stop under the circumstances, not whether the officer
could

have made a stop. Id. at 978; State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d

1040, 1046 (Utah App.), cert, granted. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).
The test is an objective one, which looks to usual police
practice to determine whether the reasonable officer would have
made the stop.
1048-49.

Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78; Lopez. 831 P.2d at

lf

[T]he officer's subjective motivation is not the

relevant inquiry."
P.2d at 977).2

Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1047 (citing Sierra, 754

Defendant's pretext argument, which focuses on

2

The Lopez majority opinion is not altogether clear on the
relevance of the officer's subjective intent to the pretext
inquiry. For example, it consistently defines the pretext
standard as the "objective question of whether a reasonable
officer would have made the stop under the same circumstances
absent the illegal
[or unconstitutional]
motivation."
Lopez, 831
P.2d at 1047 (second emphasis added). This statement arguably
leaves the door open to consideration of the officer's subjective
intent. However, in light of the majority's repeated
admonishments that the officer's subjective intent is not
relevant, e.g., ibid, ("a focus on an individual officer's
subjective intent as the measure of whether a stop is a pretext
would violate the United State Supreme Court's ruling that the
Fourth Amendment mandates an objective inquiry into police
activity"), the State's discussion of pretext doctrine assumes
this Court intends that an officer's subjective intent be
irrelevant.
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the trooper's alleged subjective intent concerning possible
narcotics trafficking, must therefore fail because it is
unsupported by case law.
Beyond asserting that the stop was pretextual,
defendant makes no effort to show that the reasonable officer
would not normally stop for the traffic violation that occurred
here.

In fact, he did not do this below.

Even on appeal,

defendant appears to be laboring under the misapprehension that
it is the State's burden to prove that the stop was not
pretextual: "Appellant submits that the [S]tate has not met its
burden to establish the factual basis for the stop to be a
legitimate function of law enforcement other than to provide an
opportunity for the trooper to search for drugs."

Br. of App. at

9.
Defendant's allocation of the burden of proof is
mistaken.

As this Court made clear in Lopez, once the State has

established that a traffic violation occurred in the officer's
presence or that the officer had probable cause or reasonable
suspicion to believe a traffic violation had occurred, the
defendant who alleges pretext must point to some evidence that
the stop was not consistent with usual police practice. Lopez,
831 P.2d at 1049.

In the absence of any such evidence, the

pretext argument necessarily fails.

See State v. Ficrueroa-

Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 282 (Utah App. 1992) (Orme, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the result in part, joined by Billings,
J.) (lack of any evidence offered by defendant to counter the
13

objectively reasonable conduct of officer defeated defendant's
pretext claim).

Accordingly, this Court should reject

defendant's pretext argument because it is based on his
unsubstantiated and irrelevant allegations concerning the
trooper's subjective motivation and because defendant has
presented no evidence indicating that a reasonable officer would
not normally stop a vehicle for travelling 71 m.p.h. in a 65
m.p.h. zone.
POINT II
ALTHOUGH IT IS CLEAR THAT THE OFFICER'S
INVESTIGATION INTO SUSPECTED NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING WAS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF A ROUTINE
TRAFFIC STOP, THAT INVESTIGATION AND ITS
CONSEQUENT DETENTION WERE PROPER BECAUSE THE
OFFICER HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO BELIEVE
DEFENDANT HAD ILLEGAL NARCOTICS IN THE
VEHICLE.
The trooper's investigative detention of defendant for
suspicion of narcotics trafficking was proper because it was
supported by reasonable suspicion, and perhaps even probable
cause, to believe that the two were carrying illegal narcotics.
The trial court found that the trooper "smelled a
strong odor of marijuana[,] which was quite obvious about the
vehicle" (R. 47). The trial court's finding is amply supported
by the record and is therefore not clearly erroneous.
Specifically, the trooper testified that when he first walked up
to the vehicle he smelled the odor of burnt marijuana (R. 145)
and that he continued to smell it as he was asking the driver for
his driver's license and explaining why he had stopped their car
(R. 111-14).

The trooper also testified that he detected the
14

odor of air fresheners coming from the vehicle, but explained
that it was not strong enough to mask the odor of the marijuana
(R. 126-27).
Defendant does not challenge the trial court's finding
that the trooper detected the odor of marijuana.

Indeed, he has

never contested the fact that there was an odor of marijuana
about the vehicle-

Rather, defendant argues that the trooper

exceeded the scope of detention permissible for a routine traffic
stop and that the encounter escalated into a de facto

arrest

unsupported by probable cause.3 Defendant's argument is
misplaced because it ignores the gradual manner in which evidence
of narcotics trafficking was observed by the trooper.

That

additional evidence justified the trooper's investigation into
possible narcotics trafficking and the consequent detention of
defendant.
This Court discussed the fourth amendment parameters
for routine traffic stops in State v. Robinson. 191 P.2d 431
(Utah App. 1990).

As explained in Robinson:

An officer conducting a routine traffic
stop may request a driver's license and
vehicle registration, conduct a computer
3

With respect to defendant's claim that the encounter was a
de facto arrest, it need only be noted that the record shows that
the trooper placed handcuffs on defendant and arrested him only
after the trooper had recovered both marijuana and cocaine from
defendant's vehicle. Defendant has never contested those facts,
and they clearly establish probable cause for arrest under Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (Supp. 1993) in keeping with the
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1990). Accordingly,
because defendant has not identified any specific point prior to
his being handcuffed at which he believes a de facto arrest
occurred, his claim must fail.
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check, and issue a citation. However, once
the driver has produced a valid license and
evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle,
"he must be allowed to proceed on his way,
without being subject to further delay by
police for additional questioning." Any
further detention for investigative
questioning after the fulfillment of the
purpose of the initial traffic stop is
justified under the fourth amendment only if
the detaining officer has a reasonable
suspicion of serious criminal activity. The
detaining officers must be able to articulate
a particularized and objective basis for
their suspicions that is drawn from the
totality of circumstances facing them at the
time of the seizure.
Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435 (citations omitted).
In the instant case, the trooper questioned defendant
and the driver about matters unrelated to the purpose of the
initial traffic stop -- including questions concerning whether
there was any contraband in the vehicle.

The State agrees with

defendant that this questioning was beyond the bounds of that
allowed during a routine traffic stop and transformed the
encounter into an investigative detention requiring reasonable
suspicion of other criminal activity.

See id.

Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 654 (Utah App. 1992).

See also State v.
The record

makes clear, however, that the trooper had the requisite
reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the additional
investigative questioning and the consequent detention of
defendant.
Under the plain smell doctrine, the trooper's detection
of the odor of marijuana would have supported a finding of
probable cause to search for additional marijuana in the vehicle.
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See State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 972-73 (Utah App. 1992)
(where officer smelled marijuana the trial court's finding of
probable cause was proper under the "plain smell" doctrine).
This Court could affirm that trial court's denial of defendant's
motion to suppress on that alternative ground.

See generally

fftate v. Brvon, 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985) (a reviewing court may
affirm on any proper grounds "even though the trial court
assigned another reason for its ruling").
In this case, however, Mangelson also relied on his
observations that indicated the presence of marijuana to support
his request for consent to search the vehicle.

Certainly, the

trooper's request for consent was justified because the odor of
marijuana provided at least reasonable suspicion to believe that
the vehicle contained marijuana.

See, e.g., People v. Lusardi,

228 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 280 Cal.Rptr. 80, 81 (Cal. Super. 1991)
(an officer making a traffic stop may not properly ask for
consent to search a vehicle absent reasonable suspicion to
believe the vehicle contains unlawful material).

Because the

trooper reasonably suspected that there were illegal drugs in
defendant's vehicle, his investigative questioning and the
consequent detention of defendant was constitutionally valid.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT DEPENDANT
CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OP HIS VEHICLE IS NOT
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND ITS DETERMINATION THAT
HIS CONSENT WAS GIVEN VOLUNTARILY IS CORRECT.
The trial court properly determined that defendant in
fact consented to the search by responding "Go ahead" when the
17

trooper asked if he could search the vehicle and concluded that
defendant's consent was "given voluntarily without duress" (R.
47-8).

In reviewing the trial court's determination that

defendant told the trooper to "Go ahead" and search the vehicle,
this Court applies a clearly erroneous standard of review.

The

trial court's ultimate conclusion that defendant's consent was
given voluntarily is, however, reviewed for correctness.

See

State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 26 (Utah Jan 7, 1993)
(holding that a "trial court's ultimate conclusion that a consent
was voluntary or involuntary is to be reviewed for correctness[;]
[however,] [t]he trial court's underlying factual findings will
not be set aside unless they are found to be clearly erroneous."
(citations omitted)).

As demonstrated below, there is ample

record evidence to support the trial court's determination on
both points.
A.

The Standard of Proof for Demonstrating Consent is

the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard.
Before addressing the merit's of defendant's challenge
to the trial court's determination of voluntary consent, a
discussion of the applicable standard of proof is in order.
Defendant properly notes that this Court in State v. Carter, 812
P.2d 460, 467 n.7 (Utah App. 1991), declined to determine whether
the State was required to prove consent by a preponderance of the
evidence -- the widely accepted standard of proof applied at
suppression hearings -- or by the more stringent clear and
convincing standard of proof advocated by a small minority of
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jurisdictions.

Understandably, defendant urges this Court to

adopt the clear and convincing standard of proof.

However, the

overwhelming majority of case law, including case law from both
the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court, makes
clear that the proper standard of proof for suppression hearings
in Utah is the preponderance of the evidence standard.
Although this Court has in some cases implied a
preference for the clear and convincing standard of proof by
embracing the standard espoused in United States v. Abbott. 546
F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1976), it does not appear to have expressly
adopted any standard of proof for suppression hearings.

See

State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 82 (utah App. 1990); State v.
Marshall. 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 800 P.2d 1105
(Utah 1990); State v. Grovier. 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah App. 1991)
(embracing Abbott).

But see Carter. 812 P.2d at 467 n.7; (noting

that "this court has not precisely dealt with the issue of the
proper burden of proof required to prove voluntary consent" and
declining to specify applicable standard of proof under the facts
presented).
The Abbott test for determining consent is as follows:
(1) There must be clear and positive
testimony that the consent was "unequivocal
and specific" and "freely and intelligently
given"; (2) the government must prove consent
was given without duress or coercion, express
or implied; and (3) the courts must indulge
every reasonable presumption against the
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights
and there must be convincing evidence that
such rights were waived.
Webb. 790 P.2d at 82 (quoting Abbott. 546 F.2d at 885 (quoting in
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turn Villano v. United States. 310 F.2d 680, 694 (10th Cir.
1962)).

This standard has been questioned as being an unduly

strict standard of proof for suppression hearings.

See, e.g..

United States v. Miller. 589 F.2d 1117, 1130-31 (1st Cir. 1978),
cert, denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979).

Indeed, insofar as the Abbott

standard imposes a clear and convincing standard of proof on the
government, it is contrary to the view expressed by the United
States Supreme Court that the government need only prove
voluntary consent to search by a preponderance of the evidence.
See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14., 94 S. Ct.
988, 996 n.14 (1974) (where, in reviewing the voluntariness of a
consent to a warrantless search, the Court said the "controlling
burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater
burden that proof by a preponderance of the evidence"); Bouriailv
v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987) (citing Matlock for
the principle that "voluntariness of consent to search must be
shown by a preponderance of the evidence").

It is also contrary

to the clear majority view that voluntariness of consent is
proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

See, e.g., United

States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Chaidez, 906 F.2d. 377 (8th Cir. 1990); White Fabricating Company
v. United States, 903 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1990); People v. Harris,
557 N.E.2d 1277 (111. App. 1990); State v. Cross. 576 A.2d 1366
(Me. 1990); State v. O'Dell, 576 A.2d 425 (R.I. 1990); People v.
Henderson, 220 Cal. App.3d 1632, 270 Cal.Rptr. 248 (1990).
The Utah Supreme Court recently recognized the
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applicability of the preponderance of the evidence standard at
suppression hearings.
1992).

State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah

In Brown, the Court was faced with the question of

whether the trial court had properly determined the owner of a
company work camp occupied by its employees had common authority
with defendant and the other residents of the camp over at least
the common areas of a particular trailer from which evidence was
seized.

Id.

In its Brown brief, the State relied on Matlock and

urged the Court to adopt the preponderance of evidence standard
of proof for suppression hearings.

See State's Brief in Brown at

page 17 n.8, a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum E.
In analyzing the issue on appeal, the Utah Supreme Court
expressly relied on Matlock in adopting the preponderance of the
evidence standard of proof:
The State bears the burden of proving common
authority, and it must do so by a
preponderance of the evidence. Matlock. 415
U.S. at 177, 178 n.14, 94 S. Ct. at 996, 996
n.14 (ff[T]he controlling burden of proof at
suppression hearings should impose no greater
burden that proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.").
Brown. 853 P.2d at 855.
The Utah Supreme Court's adoption of the Matlock
preponderance of the evidence standard is well measured, and this
Court should similarly recognize its applicability to the
question of consent.

While acceptance of the preponderance of

the evidence standard in this context is not universal, see 4
LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 11.2(c) at 236-37 (1987), the
United States Supreme Court has made clear that that standard is
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appropriate, thus explaining the majority view and the Utah
Supreme Court's acceptance of Matlock.

As the Fifth Circuit said

in overruling its prior decisions that had adopted a clear and
convincing standard of proof:
Since 1972, the Supreme Court has stated
that the preponderance of evidence standard
supplies the burden which [sic] the
government must carry to defeat a defendant;s
motion to suppress evidence when the motion
concerns the voluntariness of a confession,
Leao v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 482-89, 92 S.
Ct. 619, 623-26, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972), the
voluntariness of consent to a warrantless
search, United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164, 177 n. 14., 94 S. Ct. 988, 996 n. 14, 39
L.Ed.2d 242 (1974), the inevitable discovery
of evidence, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,
444 n. 5, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2509 n. 5, 81
L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), or the waiver of Miranda
rights, Colorado v. Connelly. 479 U.S. 157,
107 S. Ct. 515, 523, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986).
In conformity with the rationale
announced by the Supreme Court, we overrule
our previous decisions requiring the
government at a suppression hearing to prove
voluntariness [of consent to search] by clear
and convincing evidence. lf[T]he controlling
burden of proof at suppression hearings
should impose no greater burden that proof by
a preponderance of the evidence.If United
States v. Matlock. 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14,
94 S. Ct. 988, 996 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 242
(1974) .
United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d at 76.
In Lego v. Twomey. the Supreme Court explained its
rationale for the preponderance standard:
Since the purpose that a voluntariness
hearing is designed to serve has nothing
whatever to do with improving the reliability
of jury verdicts, we cannot accept the charge
that judging the admissibility of a
confession by a preponderance of the evidence
undermines the mandate of In re Winship, 397
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U.S. 358# 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368
(1970). Our decision in Winship was not
concerned with the standards for determining
the admissibility of evidence or with the
prosecution's burden of proof at a
suppression hearing when evidence is
challenged on constitutional grounds.
Winship went no further that to confirm the
fundamental right that protects "the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is
charged." Id. at 364, 90 S. Ct., at 1072. .
A guilty verdict is not rendered less
reliable simply because the admissibility of
a confession is determined by a less
stringent standard. . . .
404 U.S. at 486-87. The Court also rejected the argument that
the admissibility of evidence challenged on constitutional
grounds should be determined under a stricter standard of proof
in order to protect the values that the exclusionary rules are
designed to protect:
The argument is straightforward and has
appeal. But we are unconvinced that merely
emphasizing the importance of the values
served by the exclusionary rules is itself
sufficient demonstration that the
Constitution also requires admissibility to
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment has been excluded from federal
criminal trials for years. The same is true
of coerced confessions offered in federal or
state trials. But, from our experience over
this period of time no substantial evidence
has accumulated that federal rights have
suffered from determining admissibility by a
preponderance of the evidence. . . . Without
good cause, we are unwilling to expand
currently applicable exclusionary rules by
erecting additional barriers to placing
truthful and probative evidence before state
juries . . . . Sound reason for moving
further in this direction has not been
offered here nor do we discern any at the
present time. This is particularly true
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since the exclusionary rules are very much
aimed at deterring lawless conduct by the
police and prosecution[,] and it is very
doubtful that escalating the prosecution's
burden of proof in Fourth and Fifth Amendment
suppression hearings would be sufficiently
productive in this respect to outweigh the
public interest in placing probative evidence
before juries for the purpose of arriving at
truthful decision about guilt or innocence.
404 U.S. at 487-89 (citations and footnote omitted).
Although the Court said that "the States are free,
pursuant to their own law, to adopt a higher standard[,] [in
that] [t]hey may indeed differ as to the appropriate resolution
of the values they find at stake," id. at 489, the Utah Supreme
Court expressly adopted the preponderance of evidence standard in
Brown.

In so doing, the Court implicitly accepted the State's

invitation to do so "[b]ased upon the rational . . . expressed in
Leao [.]"

See Addendum E.

This Court should follow the course

established by the Utah Supreme Court in Brown and definitively
recognize that the controlling standard of proof at suppression
hearings is the preponderance of the evidence standard.
B.

Defendant Consented to the Search of his Vehicle.

As defendant notes in his brief, the testimony about
the events surrounding Trooper Mangelson's request to search the
vehicle are consistent up to a point.

Specifically, it is

undisputed that the trooper asked defendant and the driver: "Do
you mind if I look through the vehicle?" and that defendant
answered first by asking, "Do you want to look in the trunk?" (R.
128).

It is also undisputed that the trooper then responded,

"Yes and I also would like to look in the interior" (R. 128). At
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that point, however, the testimony of the trooper and that of the
two defendants comes into conflict.
According to both defendant and the driver, neither of
them consented to the search of the vehicle interior (R. 150-52,
156-57, 160). In contrast, the trooper testified that, although
the two appeared apprehensive, they responded "go ahead" (R.
138).

The trial court resolved this conflicting testimony in

favor of the trooper's account of what happened (R. 45, 47). The
determination of whom to believe is a matter to be resolved by
the finder of fact and --in this case --is essentially a matter
of evaluating witness credibility.

See, e.g.. State v.

Harcrraves, 806 P.2d 228, 231 (Utah App. 1991) (trial court is in
the best position to weigh witness credibility).

Accordingly,

although defendant correctly notes that there was conflicting
testimony, he has failed to demonstrate that the trial court
clearly erred in finding that defendant told the trooper to "go
ahead" when the trooper asked for consent to search the vehicle's
interior.
C.

The Trial Court Properly Determined that

Defendant's Consent to the Search was Given Voluntarily.
In addition to arguing that he did not in fact consent
to the search of the vehicle's interior, defendant also argues
that —

assuming he did consent to the search -- the trial court

erred in finding that his consent was given voluntarily.

Under

the facts of this case, the trial court's determination that
defendant's consent was given voluntarily should be upheld.
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A warrantless search conducted pursuant to voluntary
consent is valid under the fourth amendment.
200 Utah Adv. Rep. 72, 75 (Utah App. 1992).

State v. Sepulveda.
"'Whether the

requisite voluntariness exists depends on the "totality of all
the surrounding circumstances - both the characteristics of the
accused and the details of" police conduct.'"

Thurman, 203 Utah

Adv. Rep. at 21 (quoting State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah
1990), in turn quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
226 1973)).

"Both the 'characteristics of the accused' and the

'details of police conduct' must be considered in determining
whether a defendant's consent was actually a product of his or
her free will.

The prosecution bears the burden of proving that

the defendant's consent was voluntary."

Id. (citations omitted).

After an evidentiary hearing and following the
submission of memorandum from both parties, the trial court
concluded:

"The search of the subject vehicle[,] which resulted

in the initial discovery of the controlled substance[,] was made
pursuant to consent given by both defendants, which consent was
given voluntarily without duress"

(R. 48) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the question to be addressed by this Court is
whether there was evidence that supported the trial court's
conclusion.

As demonstrated below, the court's ruling is

correct.
To determine whether consent to search was given
voluntarily, a totality of the circumstances test is applied to
ensure that the consent was in fact voluntary and not the result
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of "duress or coercion, express or implied" Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
at 227. Defendant claims his consent was not given voluntarily
because the trooper's decision not to use a written consent form
-- coupled with the trooper's testimony that he would have
searched defendant's vehicle even if defendant had refused
consent and the fact that defendant was not told he had a right
to refuse consent -- indicates that defendant's consent was not
freely given.

Defendant's contention is erroneous.

Neither the United States Supreme Court nor Utah courts
have ever required that a person be informed of their right to
refuse consent in order for a consent to be deemed voluntary.
See, e.g.. State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980)
(prosecution is not required to prove that defendant knew of his
right to refuse consent in order to show consent was voluntary).
See generally, Schneckloth. 412 U.S. at 227 (knowledge of right
to refuse consent only one factor to evaluate in determining
whether consent was voluntary).

Similarly, the mere fact that

the trooper elected not to ask defendant to sign a written
consent form after obtaining his verbal consent to search the
vehicle does not demonstrate that the consent was not voluntary.
Rather, that decision goes to the weight of the evidence admitted
to support the claim of voluntary consent.

Cf. Hargraves, 806

P.2d at 231 ("Hargraves signed the consent form, an act further
evidencing voluntary consent").
Finally, the trooper's testimony to the effect that he
would have searched defendant's vehicle based solely on his
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having detected the strong odor of marijuana about the vehicle is
inconsequential.

Although the trooper testified that he

requested consent simply as a "formality" because he preferred to
obtain consent to search when possible, there is nothing in the
record that indicates the trooper told defendant that he would
search the car even if defendant refused to consent.
Accordingly, the trooper's testimony that he did not believe he
needed defendant's consent to search the vehicle because he could
have searched it based on probable cause in no way indicates that
defendant's consent was the product of duress or coercion.
Rather, it is indicative of the trooper's understanding of the
law and his desire to provide an alternate basis for justifying
his search of the vehicle in the event a court later determined
the search was not supported by probable cause.
In summary, the trial court properly concluded that
defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle.
"Although there was evidence to the contrary by way of
[defendant's and Lovegren's] testimony, the trial court was in
the best position to weigh testimonial credibility and there was
sufficient evidence to support the court's finding that there was
no coercion[.]"

Hargraves, 806 P.2d at 231. Because defendant

said, "Go ahead" when the trooper requested permission to search
the vehicle interior -- and there was no evidence of express or
implied coercion or duress -- the trial court's determination
that defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle
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should be upheld.4
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress
and affirm defendant's conviction.
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4

Defendant has not challenged the validity of his consent
under the attenuation prong of the two-pronged Thunnan test, and
the issue was not addressed in the proceedings below.
Accordingly, the State's analysis on appeal is necessarily
limited to the voluntariness of defendant's consent.
29

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

s

,

JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

1/ - • 0 „ _

***********

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NUMBER: 76E

SCOTT ALAN DELANEY
MICHAEL DALE LOVEGREN,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Defendant.
************

The Court having reviewed the arguments and memoranda
presented on defendants' Motion to Suppress Evidence hereby
denies such motion.

The Court finds that defendants were

traveling north on Interstate 15 near milepost 221 on May 14,
1991, when they were stopped for speeding 71 mph in a 65 posted
zone.

Officer Mangleson, upon approaching the car, testified

that he smelled a "strong odor of marijuana19 which "was quite
obvious about the vehicle.w
Officer Mangleson then inquired if the defendants had
"contraband in the vehicle, such as drugs alcohol or weapons."
The passenger stated that "there was alcohol in the trunk.91
Officer Mangleson then asked for permission to search the
vehicle.
trunk?"

The passenger then stated, wDo you want to look in the
The officer replied that he would like to look in both

the trunk and the interior. At that time the both defendants
seemed apprehensive, but did give consent by saying, "Go ahead."
The Court finds according to testimony given, that Officer
Mangleson had permission given voluntarily, without duress, to
search the vehicle.

In State v. Schlosser 774 P.2d 1132, 1135

(Utah 1989), the court found that "when stopping a car for a
traffic infraction, an officer may make a warrantless search of
the automobile ... if there is probable cause or consent of the
detainee."
Counsel for the plaintiff to prepare Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and an Order within 15 days of this decision
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to
the Court for signature.

This memorandum decision has no effect

until such order is signed by the Court.
Dated this 20th day of December, 1991.

cc:

Donald J. Eyre, Esq.
Michael D. Esplin, Esq.
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ADDENDUM B

r d V, d Ohtrtct Court, Jufcb County

FILED

Pat P. Greenwood.Clerk — . D e p u t y

Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021
Juab County Attorney
125 North Main Street
Nephi, Utah 84648
Telephone: 623-1141

IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

Criminal No. 76-E

SCOTT ALAN DELANEY and
MICHAEL DALE LOVEGREN,
Defendants.

The above entitled natter came on regularly for hearing on
November 15, 1991 upon the Defendants9 Motion To Suppress before
the Honorable Ray M. Harding.

The defendants were present and

represented by their attorney, Michael D. Esplin.

The State of

Utah was represented by Donald J. Eyre Jr., Juab County Attorney.
The Court having heard the evidence introduced by both the
plaintiff and defendant, reviewed the Memorandums of Law and
arguments of counsel, and having submitted its Memorandum Decision
dated December 20, 1991.
The Court being fully advised in the premises makes the
following:
1
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TINPIPgg PF TACT
1.

On May 14, 1991 Sergeant Paul V. Mangelson, a 24 year

veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol, with extensive training and
experience

in

the

area

of

drug

law

enforcement

and

drug

identification, stopped a vehicle for speeding 71 m.p.h. in a 65
m.p.h. zone on 1*15 in the area of the South Nephi interchange.
The officer had measured the speed by means of a stationary radar.
2.

The driver of the vehicle was the defendant, Michael Dale

Lovegren. The vehicle was registered to the defendant, Scott Alan
Delaney, who was a passenger in the vehicle.
3.

While talking with the driver, the officer smelled a

strong odor of marijuana which was quite obvious about the vehicle.
4.

The officer then asked the occupants if they had any guns,

drugs or alcohol in the vehicle.

The passenger, Mr. Delaney,

stated that he had some beer in the trunk.
there was any drugs in the vehicle.

Both occupants denied

The officer then asked the

occupants if they minded if he looked through the vehicle.

Mr.

Delaney then said, "Do you want to look in the trunk?91.

The

officer replied that he would like to look in both the trunk and
the interior.

At that time both defendants seemed apprehensive,

by gave consent by saying "Go ahead99.
5.

The officer then requested both occupants to exit the

vehicle and patted them down for weapons.
2
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The officer then

searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle. He first found
a cellophane bag containing marijuana on the passenger side of the
vehicle.

The officer then found a good size bindle containing

cocaine under the pleat of the driver's seat.

The officer then

placed both defendants under arrest for possession of controlled
substances•
6. The officer then continued to search the vehicle, pursuant
to the

Utah

Highway

Patrol written

policy

with

respect

to

inventorying all vehicles that are to be separated from the
occupants after arrest.

The officer then found a large amount of

cocaine, additional marijuana and drug paraphernalia in a red
duffle bag.
Pursuant to the above Findings of Fact, the Court makes the
following:

CQNCLVSIQF? PF LAW
1.

The stop of the subject vehicle was a constitutionally

valid stop based upon reasonable suspicion of speeding.
2.

The search of the subject vehicle which resulted in the

initial discovery of the controlled substance was made pursuant to
consent

given

by

both

defendants,

voluntarily without duress.
search.

which

consent

was

given

It was therefore a valid warrantless

See State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah, 1989).

3

3. The Defendants9 Motion to Suppress should be denied.
Dated this

day of ^g-^cs

4
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ADDENDUM C

,

- l C t DIatrtet Court, Jutb Csunty

FlUD
.-> '.

Pat P. Greenwood;Cierk

Deputy

Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021
Juab County Attorney
125 North Main Street
Nephi, Utah 84648
Telephone: 623-1141

IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

vs.
SCOTT ALAN DELANEY and
MICHAEL DALE LOVEGREN,

Criminal No. 76-E

Defendants.

Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
previously entered by the Court; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
Defendants' Motion to Suppress is denied.
Dated this /<C

day of

IP&P^T

. 1992.

District Judae-^

50

ADDENDUM D

Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021
Juab County Attorney
125 North Main Street
Nephi, Utah 84648
Telephone: 623-1141

IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE AND
ORDER OF PROBATION

:
Criminal No. 76-E

SCOTT ALAN DELANEY,
Defendant.

:
:

An Information having been filed charging the defendant, Scott
Alan Delaney, with the second degree felony of possessing cocaine
with the intent to distribute.
A trial was held on May 27, 1992 to the bench, and the Court
issued its Memorandum Decision dated July 9, 1992. The Court has
also issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order.
The matter was referred to the Department of Adult Probation
and Parole for the preparation of a pre-sentence report.
The defendant and his attorney, Michael D. Esplin, appeared
on October 22, 1992 for the entry of Judgment and Sentencing.

No

legal reason having been given why Judgment should not be entered.

1

It is the Judgment of the Court that the defendant is guilty of the
second degree felony of possession of cocaine with the intent to
distribute.

The defendant is sentenced to serve an indeterminate

sentence in the Utah State Prison of not less than one nor more
than fifteen years.
Imposition of the prison sentence is suspended upon successful
completion of a thirty-six month probation under the following
terms and conditions:
1. The defendant enter into an agreement with Adult Probation
and Parole and abide strictly with its terms and conditions.
2.

The defendant report to the Court and to the Department

whenever required.
3.

The defendant is to violate no law either federal, state

or municipal.
4. The defendant is to serve 60 days in the Juab County jail
with credit for four days already served. The Court will stay all
but 30 days of the sentence upon defendant's performance of the
other conditions of probation. The sentence is to be served within
the next 120 days in not less than 3 day increments.
5.

The defendant is to pay a fine in the amount of $500.00

and to pay a surcharge in the amount of $425.00.
6.

The defendant is not# to use or possess alcohol and/or

drugs while on probation.

2

7.

The defendant is to submit to random alcohol and drug

testing without the necessity of a warrant.
8.

The defendant is to attend an Alcoholics Anonymous and

Narcotics Anonymous session at least once a week.

If alcohol

and/or drugs are found in the system, the defendant shall be
required to enter into an intensive out-patient substance abuse
treatment program.
Dated this

^€^

day
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ADDENDUM E

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

t

Plaintiff-Appellee,

t

v.

t

DONALD WAYNE BROWN.

t

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 900148

Priority No. 2

t

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS OF SECOND DEGREE
MURDER, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, UNDER UTAH
CODE ANN. S 76-5-203 (1990), AND AGGRAVATED
ASSAULT, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY UNDER UTAH
CODE ANN. S 76-5-103 (1990), IN THE FIRST
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR BOX ELDER
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE F. L. GUNNELL,
PRESIDING.

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021
Attorneys for Appellee

NATHAN HULT
326 North 100 East
Logan, Utah 84321
Attorney for Appellant

47 Wash.App. 620, 736 P.2d 1079, 1086 (1987).

Under these

standards, the trial court correctly concluded that the State had
sustained its burden of proving that Bentzley had common
authority over at least the common areas of trailer #3 and that
he voluntarily consented to the police entry into the common
areas•
Trailer #3 was readily accessible to all employees of
the camp, at least with respect to those parts of the trailer
that contained the perishable food and the radios—items that
were available to and used by all employees.
recognized "common areas" within the trailer.
door to trailer #3 was never locked.

Thus, there were
Furthermore, the

And although courtesies

such as not entering a trailer when its occupants were not there
and knocking on a trailer's door before entering were generally
followed by the camp's employees, there appears to be no dispute
that any employee was free to enter trailer #3 at any time to
obtain food or a radio.

This same freedom of access would

reasonably apply to the owner and manager of the property, Mr.
It does not appear that this Court has ever expressly stated
what burden of proof applies at a suppression hearing. However,
in Matlock, the Supreme Court made clear that "the controlling
burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater
burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence." 415 U.S.
at 178 n.14 (citing Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488-489
(1972)). Based upon the rationale for the preponderance standard
expressed in Lego, 404 U.S. at 486-87, this Court should
expressly adopt a similar standard for Utah. See, e.g.. United
States v. Hurtado, 905 P.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990)j State v.
Cress, 576 A.2d 1366, 1367 (Me. 1990); State v. O'Dell, 576 A.2d
425, 427 (R.I. 1990)? People v. Henderson, 220 Cal.App.3d 1632,
270 Cal.Rptr. 248, 257 (1990).
Q

Defendant challenges only the trial court's conclusion that
Bentzley had authority to consent to the search of the trailer;
he does not question the voluntariness of that consent.
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